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Viral Sovereignty, Intellectual Property, and the
Changing Global System for Sharing Pathogens for
Infectious Disease Research
Sam HalabiO
INTRODUCTION

Access to biological samples is crucial to the research and development
process that leads to diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines to address new
and reemerging infectious diseases.0 Biological samples provide raw data
about the pathogen, allow researchers to analyze the evolution of the
pathogen, and to understand the mechanisms of replication and infection.
Comprehensive understanding of human pathogens is the important first step
toward developing effective treatments and vaccines. However, access to
biological samples has become an increasingly substantial barrier to this
essential step in the research and development process.0
Researchers at major institutions across the United States reported
difficulty in obtaining any samples of the Ebola virus during the 2014-15
outbreak and even those that did obtain samples reported difficulties
obtaining fresh samples thereafter to identify mutations in the virus as it
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1.
See Ivan Brankovid, Jelena Malogajski & Servaas A. Moord, Biobanking and
translation of human genetics and genomics for infectious diseases, 3 APPLIED &
TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 30, 30-31 (2014) (discussing the role of "biobanks" in research
and development related to infectious disease, including diagnosis and therapeutics); see also
Anthony S. Fauci, New andReemerging Diseases: The Importance of Biomedical Research,
4 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 374, 374 (1998) (discussing the importance of investing in
research on vaccines to prevent new and reemerging diseases).
2. Stacey Pereira, Motivations andBarriersto SharingBiologicalSamples: A Case Study,
3 J. OF PERSONALIZED MED. 102, 102 (2013).
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spread. 0 Researchers similarly encountered difficulties accessing adequate
samples and disease data about the Zika virus, largely due to Brazilian law
affecting material transfer." As a result of Indonesia's 2006 refusal to share
H5N1 virus samples with the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global
Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) pending equitable
access to benefits, including intellectual property rights, researchers at
academic institutions and biomedical firms must now enter into material
transfer agreements (MTAs) with the WHO in exchange for access to
potentially pandemic strains of influenza.0 Potential legal claims asserted by
the Saudi government over the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) pervade ongoing research into antiviral and
vaccine research against the virus.0
Access to biological samples, including human pathogens, is becoming
more difficult while predictive analytics suggest that the next major
infectious disease threat is likely to originate in the tropical zone where the
above-mentioned countries lie, as well as many others (Fig. 1).9 Joint
ventures and collaborations between scientists in biodiverse but resourcescarce countries in Africa, Asia, and South America are growing in
importance to the identification, sampling, biobanking, and research of
potentially human pathogenic viruses. These collaborations are crucial to the
detection, prevention, and response to infectious disease threats.

3.

Julie Steenhuysen, U.S. Ebola ResearchersPleadfor Ebola Virus Samples, REUTERS

(Nov. 5, 2014 6:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usa-researchexclusive-idUSKBNOIP1DZ20141105.
4.
Associated Press, Few Zika Samples are Being Shared by Brazil, Worrying
International Researchers, STATNEWS (last updated Feb. 4, 2016 12:19 PM),

https ://www. statnews.com/2016/02/03/zika-samples-brazil/.
5.
David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health
Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88-89 (2008); see also Michelle Rourke,
On the Origin of Samples: Pathogen Provenance and the Rise of the Material Transfer
Agreement, 3 J. ScI. L. 1, 2 (2017).

6.

Laurie Garrett, Wy a Saudi Virus is SpreadingAlarm, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (May

29, 2013), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/why-saudi-virus-spreading-alarm.
7. Kate E. Jones et al., Global Trends in EmergingInfectious Diseases, 451 NATURE 990,
993 (2008).
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Fig. 1. Global
Distribution of
Relative Risk of an
Emerging Infectious
Disease Event as
adapted from Jones,
Patel, et. al., Global
Trends in Emerging
Infectious Diseases.
Nature 451, 990-993.
21 February 2008.
Fig. 1 Legend
Green: No to low risk
Yellow: Medium risk
Red: High risk
A principal reason that access to biological samples has declined in these
contexts is the ascendance of the MTA as the medium of transfer, especially
between researchers (academic, commercial, non-profit) in different
countries. 0
Surveys and interview-based studies of researchers have
concluded that access to biological samples is increasingly hampered by
negotiations over MTAs.] MTAs are instruments that define terms and
provisions in connection with the transfer of materials for multiple purposes
including safekeeping, storing (for instance, storage in gene banks),
protecting intellectual property rights, prohibiting sharing with third or other
downstream parties, and attributing credit in peer-reviewed journals.0
MTAs are contracts protected by law. If one of their provisions is not
followed, the contract is breached and the wronged party has the right to bring
action against the other, including a suit for damages.
While MTAs originated when the distinction between upstream research
conducted in noncommercial laboratories and academic institutions and

8.
Tania Bubela, Jenilee Guebert & Amrita Mishra, Use andMisuse ofMaterial Transfer
Agreements: Lessons in Proportionalityfrom Research, Repositories,andLitigation. 13 PLOS
BIOLOGY (2015).
9.
Victor Rodriguez, Material Transfer Agreements: Open Science vs. Proprietary
Claims, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 489, 489 (2005).
10. Bubela, Guebert & Mishra, supra note 8; see also ALAN B. BENNETT, WENDY D.
STREITZ & RAFAEL A. GACEL, Specific Issues with Material Transfer Agreements, in
INTELLECTUAL PROP. MGMT. IN HEALTH AND AGRIC. INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST

PRACTICES, 697-99 (A. Krattiger, et al. eds., 2007).
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downstream applied research was sharper, they are now commonplace.0
MTAs "may take a variety of forms, from letters accompanying a shipment
of materials to detailed and formally negotiated contracts signed by both
parties before a transfer of materials is made in or out of research units." 5
Outbound agreements often include asserted intellectual property rights to
the material in question, whereas terms in inbound agreements may "impose
research restrictions that infringe upon academic freedom or dissemination
of research results, and may conflict with specific requirements of funding
agreements." 5
This article analyzes the substantial changes under way in the global
system for infectious disease research demonstrated by the changing
practices in negotiating MTAs. Instead of the open system of sharing
bacterial and viral human pathogens that characterized the research system
for much of the 20th Century, notions of "viral sovereignty," access
contingent upon provisions like sharing research benefits, and acrimonious
negotiations, are far more common.0 The increasing barriers to the flow of
research material and related data like genetic sequencing information are
posing threats to public health responses and the potential use of such
resources in diagnostic, therapeutic, and vaccine innovations.0 This article

assesses the extent of these barriers and proposes approaches that may
address the global inequalities behind material transfer negotiation issues.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief history of the
human pathogen sharing system that existed prior to the movement for
sovereignty over biological resources that commenced in the 1970s. That

11.
See Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the
DocumentProposalfora Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Councilon Access
to Genetic Resources and the Fair Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the
Union, SWD (2012) 292 final (Apr. 10, 2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/CS/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0292 ("Genetic resources, and sometimes also
associated traditional knowledge, are of diverse importance across and within sectors, be it for
commercial or non-commercial activities. Analytically, it is useful to distinguish between
activities and players at the beginning of the genetic resources value chain ("upstream") and
activities and players at its end ("downstream"). Those involved in "upstream" activities
(collecting in the wild, description of collected material, storing in collections) face many
common challenges in relation to access and benefit-sharing, the same goes for those involved
in "downstream" activities (basic and applied research, product development and
commercialization)."
12.
Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 489.
13.
Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 489.
14.
J. Benjamin Hurlbut, A Science That Knows No Country: Pandemic Preparedness,
Global Risk, Sovereign Science, BIG DATA & SOCIETY 1, 5-6 (2017); see also David P. Fidler,
Asia's Participationin Global Health Diplomacy and GlobalHealth Governance, 5 AsIAN J.
WTO INT'L HEALTH L. POL'Y 269, 287 (2010).
15.
Carolina dos S. Ribeiro et al., How Ownership Rights Over MicroorganismsAffect
Infectious Disease Control and Innovation: A Root-Cause Analysis of Barriers to Data
Sharing as Experienced by Key Stakeholders, 13 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2018).
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system involved various means by which researchers, especially in Europe
and North America, obtained pathogen samples from low- and middleincome countries as well as some sui generis systems like the WHO's system
for influenza sample sharing and research.0 Part III explains how the 1993
Convention on Biological Diversity, the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising
from their Utilization, and the 2011 WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework shifted the system from one in which pathogens and other
biological materials traveled essentially unregulated to one in which MTAs
negotiated by governments and firms, but rarely researchers themselves,
prevail. Part IV analyzes the disruptions the current regulatory system causes
to the biomedical research system that leads to diagnostics, therapeutics, and
vaccines. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE HISTORY OF HUMAN PATHOGEN SHARING
The free flow of biological resources, including pathogens, and the
knowledge generated by those studying them, has resulted in some of the
most important diagnostics therapeutics, and vaccines that have saved
billions of lives worldwide.I
Since the 1950s, WHO's Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System (formerly Global Influenza Surveillance
Network) has connected influenza samples from all over the world to
reference laboratories, researchers, and vaccine manufacturers.0
This
connection has generated seasonal and pandemic flu vaccines that have saved
hundreds of thousands of lives.I0 The transfer of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) mostly from west-central Africa has been crucial to the
development of antiretroviral therapies that have drastically reduced its
public health burden.0 Similarly, the transfer of thousands of Ebola samples
16.
See generally GlobalInfluenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (2015), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/OPGISRS FINAL.pdf [hereinafter

GISRS].
17.
Petra Klepac et al., Towards the Endgame and Beyond. Complexities and Challenges
for the Elimination of Infectious Diseases, 368 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B:

BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1, 1 (2013) ("Successful control measures have interrupted the local
transmission of human infectious diseases such as measles, malaria and polio, and saved and
improved billions of lives.").
18.
GISRS, supra note 16.
19.
CDC Study: Flu Vaccine Saved 40,000 Lives During 9 Year Period, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/news/fluvaccine-saved-lives.htm; see also Liz Szabo, CDC: Vaccines Save Hundreds of Thousands of
Lives,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
24,
2014
1:00PM)

https://www.usatoday.conm/story/news/nation/20 14/04/24/cdc-vaccine-benefits/8094789/.
20.
See generally Paul M. Sharp & Beatrice H. Hahn, The Evolution of HIV-1 and the
Origin of AIDS, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2487, 2494
(2010) (outlining the origins of HIV); see also Samuel Broder, The Development of

AntiretroviralTherapy and its Impact on the HIV-1AIDS Pandemic, 85 ANTIVIRAL RES. 1, 1
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out of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the 2014-15 outbreak led to
the first rapid diagnostic for Ebola, several promising pharmaceutical
candidates, and a vaccine that has demonstrated 100 percent protection
against the virus.El
However, like most extractive and enterprising activities undertaken in
low- and middle-income countries, the flow of biological resources including
pathogens, results in benefits mostly enjoyed in wealthier countries.u
Because life as a general matter (including seeds, plants for agriculture, and
other biological resources) was viewed as the "common heritage" of
humanity over most of the twentieth century, there were few barriers to
researchers, firms, or foreign governments transferring biological resources
out of poorer countries for purposes of research and development in wealthier
countries.0 Within the scientific community, this large-scale transfer
occurred through what Patricia Garcia of the Universidad Peruana Cayetano
Heredia calls three "semi-colonial" models: "postal", "parachute" and
annexed sites.=
A. PostalAcquisition
The scientific process relies upon independent verification of results,
sharing of data and other resources, and attributing contributions that advance
human knowledge to scientific researchers. As a result, researchers often
develop sharing and reciprocity norms that encourage scientists in low- and
middle-income countries to share samples and related data with colleagues
in wealthier countries with more advanced laboratory and technical
capabilities.0
Under this model, researchers in wealthy countries request biological
(2010).

21.
Ana Maria Henao-Restrepo, et al., Efficacy and Effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored
Vaccine Expressing Ebola Surface Glycoprotein: Interim Results from the Guinea Ring
Vaccination Cluster-RandomisedTrial, 386 LANCET 857, 857 (2015).
22.
See generally Ciara Staunton & Keymanthrj Moodley, DataMining and Biological
Sample Exportationfrom South Africa: A New Wave of Bioexploitation Under the Guise of
Clinical Care?, 106 SouTH AFRICAN MED. J. 136, 138 (2016) ("For decades there has been a
unidirectional flow of samples out of Africa to various destinations in developed countries,
with no benefit to local populations or local researchers.").
23.
See e.g.,JNT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY AND
SHARING THE BENEFITS: LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY (Santiago Carrizosa et al., eds.) (2004).

24. Patricia Garcia, Presentation for Salud Global, International Partnerships: View from
the South... (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (unpublished presentation, Universidad Peruana
Cayetano Heredia).
25.
See generally Kayvon Modjarrad et al., Developing GlobalNorms for Sharing Data
and Results during Public Health Emergencies, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2016) (referencing the
World Health Organization's consultation in Geneva, Switzerland in September 2015 to
advance the developing of data sharing norms).
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samples from colleagues in low- or middle-income countries, sometimes with
the understanding that some other resource or knowledge will be shared. 9
Indeed, this is precisely how samples of the MERS-CoV virus were
transferred to the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands in 2012.0 Ali
Mohamed Zaki, an Egyptian physician working in Saudi Arabia, contacted
scientists at Erasmus for technical help after he suspected that a novel virus
caused the severe respiratory symptoms, renal failure, and death of a
patient. 5 According to Zaki:
[Erasmus] confirmed my initial findings and asked me to send them a small
portion of patient zero's sample because they wanted to do some more
testing and they were running out of RNA. I didn't have any mechanism
to ship a live virus sample while maintaining the cold chain during transit.
So, I filtered the sputum sample and mixed the filtrate with Vero cells,
packaged the tightly capped tube in appropriate biohazard containers and
shipped it with a private carrier at room temperature as a diagnostic
sample. It worked. They received it in the Netherlands and managed to
recover the live virus, the first genetic jfalysis of this novel virus published
in New EnglandJournal ofMedicine. 2
Dr. Zaki's experience is representative, and, but for the legal changes
identified in this article, similar experiences would have continued, given that
new technologies are making the transfer of biological materials across
borders easier and more reliable. 9 There were millions of such transfers over
the course of the 20th Century.B As discussed in Part III below, the transfer
of MERS-CoV in this way occurred after the major changes in international
law were implemented, and the result significantly delayed the response after
MERS affected South Korea, as did the continued disputes between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and those that were developinh diagnostics,
therapeutics, and vaccines based on samples sent to Erasmus.

26.

Garcia, supra note 24.

27.
Clare Dyer & Owen Dyer, WHO to Probe Claims that Dutch Scientists Restricted
Access to Novel Coronavirus,346 BMJ 1, 1 (2013).
28.
Islam Hussein, The Story of the FirstAMERS Patient,NATURE MIDDLE EAST (June 2,
2014), https://www.natureasia.com/en/nmiiddleeast/article/10. 1038/nmiiddleeast.2014.134.
29. Id.
30.
Maryam Shabikhani et al., The Procurement, Storage, and Quality Assurance of
Frozen Blood and Tissue Biospecimens in Pathology,Biorepository,andBiobank Settings, 47
CLINICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 258, 258-66 (2014).
31.
Jinmie B. Vaught, et al., Biospecimens and Biorepositories: From Afterthought to
Science, 21 CANCER EPIDEMIOL BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 253, 253 (2012).

32.
See Myoung-don Oh et al., Middle East Respiratory Syndrome: What We Learned
from the 2015 Outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 33 S. KOR. J. INTERNAL MED. 233, 234

(2018) (stating that the MERS-CoV epidemic "lasted for two months" and resulted in the
quarantine of over 16,000 individuals for 14 days).
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B. ParachuteAcquisition
Parachute acquisition refers to the collection of biological samples in a
country by a foreign researcher who later returns to his or her home country
to conduct research on the collected samples.fl This form of collection can
be extremely difficult to detect because using natural resources for their
genetic components requires a minute quantity of genetic material.0 For
example, in the early 2000s, French researchers conducted interviews in
Brazil and French Guiana to find out about local antimalarial remedies,
including those derived from the indigenous Quassia amara shrub._
In
2005, that preliminary research was published.a Ten years later, a patent
was granted for a new compound from the Quassia amarawhich had
antimalarial properties. [ Parachute acquisition is the kind of transfer now
viewed broadly as "biopiracy" by low- and middle-income countries.1 Its
practice resulted in some of the measures that now encourage MTAs to
govern the terms under which samples are transferred out of the host
country's teritory.0
Many low- and middle-income countries argue that there is a
"unidirectional flow of samples" out of developing countries and into
developed nations for both commercial and non-commercial research and
development.0
These countries argue that this flow has "impacted
negatively on the development of local capacity, infrastructure and expertise"
of the originating countries.[
As a result, many countries now require
foreign researchers to establish a collaboration with local researchers before
obtaining local samples.0
C. Annexed Research Sites for the Collection ofNew Samples
The use of annexed research sites in the provider country is another
method for obtaining local genetic resources.0 This means that samples of
genetic resources are collected locally, and that at least part of the research
33.
Garcia, supra note 24, at 4.
34.
Florian Rabitz, Biopiracy after the Nagoya Protocol: Problem Structure, Regime
Design and Implementation Challenges, 9 BRAZ.POL. Sci. REV. 30, 38 (2015).
35.
Janna Rose, Biopiracy: When Indigenous Knowledge is Patentedfor Profit, THE
CONVERSATION (Mar. 7, 2016), http://theconversation.com/biopiracy-when-indigenousknowledge-is-patented-for-profit-55589.
36.
Id
37.
Id
38.
Id
39.
Daniel F. Robinson, Locating Biopiracy: Geographically and Culturally Situated
Knowledges, 42 ENV'T & PLAN. 38, 47 (2010).
40.
Staunton & Moodley, supra note 22, at 136.
41.
Staunton & Moodley, supra note 22, at 136.
42.
Staunton & Moodley, supra note 22, at 136-37.
43.
Garcia, supra note 24, at 4.
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on these genetic resources is conducted within the host country. 8 This can
be done by foreign or local researchers. Annexed research sites that are
funded, developed, and operated by foreign nationals without the
participation of the originator country have the same effect as postal and
parachute acquisitions of biological resources and related knowledge.0
On the other hand, annexed research may also encourage the active
participation of partners within the provider country to foster international
collaboration, conduct training, share expertise, engage in technology
transfer, and help build scientific capacity in the host nation.R Some
countries have implemented laws that require foreign scientists to engage
with the local scientific community even if they do not intend to transfer any
biological resources outside of the host country.0 Brazil, for example,
requires foreign researchers to register with a local partner before
commencing research activities. 8 These measures can help facilitate
technology and information flow to poorer countries, but they also add a
significant layer of bureaucracy and delay to the research process.
D. GlobalInfluenza PathogenSharing
Over the many decades in which biological resources flowed from lowand middle-income countries for research and development in richer ones,
there accompanied specific, international systems that addressed matters of
particular concern to the international community. WHO's GISRS facilitates
the collection and transfer of influenza samples from all over the world. 5 As
a result of the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918-19, which killed
approximately three percent of the world's Ropulation and threatens to recur
because of the virus's capacity to reassort, WHO established GISRS after
World War 11.0 The system "monitor[s] the evolution of influenza viruses
and provides recommendations as to which candidate vaccine viruses should
be included in seasonal and pandemic vaccines". 5 The system is structured
around six WHO collaborating centers located in Australia, China, Japan, the
44.
Garcia, supra note 24, at 4.
45.
Garcia, supra note 24, at 4-5.
46.
Garcia, supra note 24, at 17-18.
47.
David Smith et al., Explanation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit
Sharing and Its Implicationfor Microbiology, 163 MICROBIOLOGY 289, 290 (2017).
48. Id.at 294.
49.
Self-Assessment of the Who Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System,
WORLD

HEALTH

ORG.

1,

6

(Oct.

2014),

http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/gisrs self assessment.pdf [hereinafter SelfAssessment].
50.
SAM F. HALABI & JOHN MONOAHAN, FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZED MARKETS 64 (Sam F. Halabi ed. 2015).

51.
52.

GISRS, supra note 16.
Self-Assessment, supranote 49, at 6.
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U.K. and the U.S., "four WHO essential resource laboratories, and 141
institutions recognized by WHO as national influenza centers (NICs) located
in 111 countries."E NICs "collect clinical specimens for the detection of
influenza viruses through national surveillance networks".0 Until 2006, this
system regularly collected influenza samples from around the world,
distributed them to collaborating centers, and shared them with non-profit
and for-profit actors to develop vaccines and antivirals.8 In 2006 and 2007,
Indonesia refused to share samples of H5N1, arguing the system took
resources from poor countries to develop products that largely benefited
populations in wealthy countries.0 Its refusal threatened to up-end the global
system of influenza surveillance and research that had existed for over 50
years.0
III. THE TRANSITION FROM UNENCUMBERED SHARING TO MATERIAL
TRANSFER AGREEMENTS

Indonesia's position reflected the predictable course of a long-running
dispute over distribution of wealth between wealthy and poorer countries.
The latter countries regarded past and continuing exploitation by the former
powers, or their corporate instrumentalities, as the basic reason for their
poverty.E These sentiments justified some of the major redistributions,
mostly in the form of nationalization, over the course of the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s.E
A. The Path to Access and Benefit SharingMaterial TransferAgreements
for Human Pathogens: The Convention on BiologicalDiversity and the
Nagoya Protocol
In 1964, developing countries formed the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in order to pursue trade-related
development policies marginalized by what had become the trade negotiation
forum for wealthy countries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
53.
Self-Assessment, supra note 49, at 6, 16.
54. Self-Assessment, supra note 49, at 6.
55. Operational Guidance on Sharing Seasonal Influenza viruses with WHO
CollaboratingCenters (CCs) under the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System
(GISRS),

WORLD

HEALTH

ORG.,

1,

4

(2007),

http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrslaboratory/national influenza centres/NIC virus sharin
g_guidance_20171103.pdf; Fidler, supra note 5, at 88.
56. Fidler, supranote 5, at 88.
57. Fidler, supranote 5, at 88.
58.
DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 88-

90 (1998).
59.
Guiliano Garavini, Completing Decolonization. The 1973 'Oil Shock' and the
Strugglefor Economic Rights, 33 INT'L HIST. REV. 473, 473-79 (2011).
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(GATT).O
UNCTAD existed to "maximize the trade, investment and
development opportunities of developing countries and assist them in their
efforts to integrate into the world economy on an equitable basis."EI Shortly
after its formation, UNCTAD began to focus on technology transfer as a
crucial aspect of redistributing wealth. 5
By the early 1970s, despite UNCTAD, nationalization, and the declaration
that wealthy countries would help improve poorer countries, the relative
position of developing countries compared to developed countries had barely
narrowed, and for many, their absolute position had worsened. 5 As a result,
developing countries became more aggressive in their calls for policies aimed
at redistribution.0 On April 19, 1972, Mexican President Luis Echeverria
Alvarez urged the adoption of a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of

States aimed at exerting greater authority over natural resources.0 At the
time, those resources were thought to be mostly commodities like petroleum,
rubber, and agricultural goods.0 However, the general call for control over
natural resources later expanded in the early 1990s to include human
pathogens.0

In 1972, the U.N. also held the first of many global conferences on the
Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. E In the decade after the 1972
conference, scientists and non-governmental organizations had elevated the
issue of biodiversity as a pressing environmental issue.0 The threats to the
rainforests in the Amazon basin - logging, extraction, agriculture - illustrated
the rapid loss of crucial biological resources, as well as the role that firms

60.
John Toye, UNCTAD at 50: A Short History, UNCTAD 1, 3-4, 14 (2014),
https ://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osg2014d l_en.pdf.
61.
United Nations,
UNCTAD In Brief UNCTAD
1, 2 (2016),
https ://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmniisc l7rev 1 en.pdf.
62.

United Nations, Proceedingsof the United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development, 227, U.N. Doc. TD 1, 97 (1968), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/td97voll_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD]; see also PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE:
PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 23 (2010).
63.
Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe Jr., The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties
of States: A Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw ?, 9 INT'L. LAW. 295, 296 (1975).
64.
Id.

65.
66.

Id.
UNCTAD, supra note 62, at 116-119.

67.
Johnathon B. Tucker, Biosecurity: Limiting TerroristAccess to Deadly Pathogens,
UNITED
STATES
INSTITUTE
OF
PEACE
27
(2003),

https ://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks52.pdf.
68.

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UNITED NATIONS,

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milestones/humanenvirolnent (last visited October 8,
2018).
69.
Daniel H. Janzen, The Future of Tropical Ecology, 17 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 305, 305-306 (1986); see generallyJosd Luiz de Andrade Franco, The Concept
of Biodiversity and the History of ConservationBiology, 32 HISTORiA 21, 21-25.
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played in that loss.0 In 1987, the governing council of UNEP resolved to
create a working group to explore the possibility of developing a legally
binding treaty to protect biological resources.0 In 1991, formal multilateral
negotiations began on a Convention for Biological Diversity.0
Eventually these preparatory meetings culminated in the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development (or "Earth Summit"), held in
June 1992 in Rio De Janeiro, the result of which included the Rio Declaration,
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, and the U.N. Convention to Combat
Desertification.E The CBD traced a direct line to the 1962 United Nations
General Assembly's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, which asserted that it was the inalienable right of each state to
handle natural resources as they saw fit and that any profits resulting from
the use of these resources should be shared "between investors and the
recipient state".0
Article 15 of the CBD required "fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources", a phrase that gave rise to
a great deal of uncertainty, even as it shaped national "bioprospecting"
laws.0 Before 2010, CBD Article 15 had been largely guided by the nonbinding Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilization.0 The
Bonn Guidelines recommended the following provisions for contracts
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See generally Michael J. Heckenberger et al., The Legacy of CulturalLandscapes in
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the ParagominasRegion of the State of Peru, 21 BIOTROPICA 98, 98-106 (1989).
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between sovereign states and commercial entities:
(a) Regulating the use of resources in order to take into account ethical
concerns of the particular Parties and stakeholders, in particular indigenous
and local communities concerned;
(b) Making provision to ensure the continued customary use of genetic
resources and related knowledge;
(c) Provision for the use of intellectual property rights include joint
research, obligation to implement rights on inventions obtained and to
provide licenses by common consent;
(d) The possibility of joint ownershipj of intellectual property rights
according to the degree of contribution.0
The CBD thus paved the way for the transfer of biological resources to
take place through MTAs, often regulated by governments, rather than
through informal sharing through scientific networks.
B. Bioprospectingafter the Conventionfor BiologicalDiversity
In 1991, informed by the CBD negotiations, U.S. pharmaceutical firm
Merck entered into an agreement with the government of Costa Rica.0
Under that agreement, the National Biodiversity Institute ("lNBio"), a nonprofit scientific organization created by the government of Costa Rica,
provided 10,000 samples of plants, animals, and soil to Merck.E Merck
enjoyed the exclusive rights to study these samples for twoyears, and
retained the patent rights on drugs developed using the samples.U In return,
Merck agreed to pay 1NBio $1 million and to transfer $130,000 worth of
laboratory equipment.0 The agreement also specified royalties to be paid to
the Costa Rican government's Ministry of Natural Resources.0
Another agreement pertaining to bioprospecting is the agreement executed
between ICBG (International Cooperative Biodiversity Group, a U.S.
governmental venture) and Bistol-Myers Squibb, Monsanto, and Glaxo
77.
KATHARINA ROGALLA VON BIEBERSTEIN & KONSTANTIA KOUTOUKI, THE NAGOYA
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Wellcome (a consortium of private companies) for the collection of Peruvian
medicinal plants.0 ICBG has executed contracts with different organizations
for its bioprospecting activities.0 The objective of the program is to benefit
both Peruvian communities and the global scientific community by
discovering and researching possibilities for new solutions to human health
problems based on previously unexplored genetic resources.
Beginning with the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the
CBD in 2004, groups of developing countries, including the Group of LikeMinded Megadiverse Countries, pressed for a treaty to regulate material
transfer terms.0
C. Indonesiaand the Origins of Viral Sovereignty
In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from WHO GISRS,
compromising efforts to monitor and produce vaccines in response to the
avian flu outbreak that threatened to become easily transmissible from birds
to humans and then between humans. 9 Indonesia asserted that its decision
was a response to an Australian company's patent on a vaccine derived from
a virus sample that Indonesia provided to WHO.D More importantly for
purposes of human pathogen sharing, Indonesia argued that the H5N1 virus
samples it had collected in its territory constituted the same kinds of natural
resources as petroleum or rubber would previously have been considered, as
well as a form of biodiversity protected under Articles 15 and 16 of the
CBD.8 Indonesia agreed to resume sharing under an interim agreement that
granted it access to antivirals and vaccines, and promised to develop a
broader international agreement on influenza pathogen access and benefit
sharing.0 Indonesia's actions introduced the previously unknown concept
of "viral sovereignty" to the scientific sharing process.0 "Viral sovereignty"
refers to situations in which countries assert that viruses located and isolated
from within their territories are their sovereign property.0
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Spurred by Indonesia's actions and the response it generated within the
WHO, countries negotiated the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization (Nagoya Protocol), a treaty that established the regulatory
framework for MTAs.0 The treaty required a government's "prior informed
consent" over its sovereign human pathogens and "mutually agreed terms"
for the return of benefits, should those pathogens be shared.0 The Nagoya
Protocol regulates commercial, non-profit, university-driven, and all other
forms of microbiological research that lead to drugs, medical therapies,
vaccines and other products derived from genetic resources in member states
(the majority are developing countries) and, given the limited reach of current
international instruments, fundamentally changes the nature and process of
international scientific research.0
D. Lawyers Substitutefor Scientists in the GlobalInfectious Disease
Research System
The structure of graduate training all over the world for scientists includes
little if any coursework or experiential curriculum aimed at negotiating
research inputs.0 Graduate education and training emphasizes academic
coursework in the early years of a master or doctoral level program followed
by active research.0 While there are no surveys of written curricular
components, survey-based research involving scientists shows that most
researchers do not know how their biological samples are obtained, do not
know how to use an MTA, and rarely participate in negotiations when they
do occur.E
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As a result, lawyers and public officials have become a more significant
barrier for access, research, sharing, and publication. Before the Convention
on Biological Diversity, and the changes it facilitated, when scientists
received shipments of biological materials, undertook field work in foreign
countries, or worked in partnership with institutions abroad, they encountered
few obstacles to the normal scientific process. 8 To be certain, customs and
import laws regulate biological samples as they move across borders, but for
the most part, those laws have rarely been assessed as erecting a significant
barrier to infectious disease research. 5
Lawyers by the nature of their training are more likely to view their
clients' interests through criteria more familiar to them - trying to ensure
monetary benefits flow to their clients (research universities and firms),
maximizing their ability to control the use of samples including control over
transfer and notification of new inventions, and scrutinizing material transfer
agreement terms. While these are important factors to consider, there are
additional interests in the overall infectious disease research process that
scientists are better able to identify and communicate. The participation of
scientists in the transfer process is therefore essential for the preservation of
both institutional interests and the integrity of the research process. Whether
through adaptations in graduate training or better forums for scientists to
participate in the negotiation process, better integration of their viewpoints is
important to reducing the barriers erected through MTAs.
IV. MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE NEW SYSTEM OF
PATHOGEN SHARING

A. The BarriersMaterial TransferAgreements Pose
The effect of these movements in international law - toward greater
assertion of sovereign proprietary rights over biological resources - and the
607, 617 (2016); see also Claire Lajaunie & Calvin Wai-Loon Ho, Pathogens Collections,
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practicalities of transferring biological samples across borders has been
profound. The Nagoya Protocol established a complex framework for
regulating scientists' (including botanical gardens, universities, libraries, and
certainly for-profit firms) ability to conduct research in low- and middleincome countries.0 Under the Nagoya Protocol, a researcher would ideally
contact the country's national focal point (NFP), an administrative body
suggested by the treaty, to commence access-and-benefit sharing
negotiations.El The NFP, in turn, would identify the correct "competent
national authority" to discuss prior informed consent and mutually agreed
terms for benefit sharing.0 While this seems straightforward, the competent
national authority may be a ministry of health, ministry of environment,
ministry of indigenous issues, ministry of interior, or some other
department.0 In Brazil, for example up to nine ministries may have
jurisdiction over the pathogen at issue.
In some countries, the competent national authority will issue permits
generally known as "internationally recognized certificates of compliance,"
which "serve as evidence that the genetic resource which it covers has been
accessed in accordance with prior informed consent and mutually agreed
terms as required by the domestic legislation or regulatory requirements of
the Party providing prior informed consent.D The terms of the agreement
outline how the samples are to be used and stored, whether the samples may
be kept after the term of the initial permission, whether they should be
returned to the provider or destroyed, and whether the samples or anypart
thereof may be transferred to third parties and under which conditions.El
Benefit-sharing terms cover topics such as how the research results will be
disseminated, how related data will be managed, how intellectual property
rights (including monetary terms for royalties and licenses) will be
developed, and how the provider country ought to be acknowledged in
research publications.0
100.
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Research staff usually lacks both the knowledge and legal authority to
enter into contracts like MTAs on behalf of their institutions.E Instead, at
most leading research-intensive institutions including universities and firms,
MTAs are drafted and negotiated by legal counsel located within technology
transfer offices (TTOs) or research services offices.0 These offices manage
research partnerships, sponsored research, as well as commercialization
activities such as patenting, technology licensing, and creating new
companies. D As described above, the result is a protracted negotiation
process that often lacks significant scientific input.
The volume of these agreements is large and increasing. For example,
"one large pharmaceutical company indicated that it had six administrators
dealing with more than 1,000 MTAs in 2000, and many of these agreements
required lengthy negotiation."
Material transfers between private- and
public-sector institutions are typically the most complex kinds of
negotiations and are much more prone to failure.0 The ascent of MTAs has
created a feedback effect.EJ When a provider declares that it owns the results
of research using its material, or even requires its permission to conduct
certain kinds of research, it may become difficult or impossible to complete
follow-up research, because an entirely new MTA is required for the new,
secondary material or data created.E
The relatively scant evidence suggests that the increasing prevalence of
MTAs is restricting research efforts. 2
In 2004, eighteen percent of
academic requests for genetic materials were denied, while industry requests
were similarly denied thirty-three percent of the time.El Most problems anise
from MTAs and associated delays.0 For example, researchers hoping to
develop "combination microbicides" - the combining of different biological
agents that act at different points in the infection process - must overcome
challenges in "obtaining sufficient information about the properties of needed
materials."O Genetic resources are not typically sources of much market
108.
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value, but instead, in market terms, are just "precompetitive inputs" that
require combination with "large quantities of [other] genetic materials" to
result in biomedical breakthroughs.El With MTAs, researchers encounter
high transaction costs, substantial delays, and even refusals to negotiate for
access or use, thus burdening the scientific research process.0
B. Burdening the Research and Development Process: PandemicInfluenza,
MERS-CoV and Zika
While Indonesia's withholding of H5N1 samples generated greater
systems for benefit sharing both in the short-term and through the 2011
WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, it presented a major
threat to global public health.E As David Fidler, a global expert on the law
of infectious diseases, noted, "[w]ithout access to Indonesia's influenza
strains, global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement of
diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention strategies, which
depend on the information surveillance provides." 5 At that point in time,
H5N1 exhibited a sixty percent fatality rate among those infected, and its
potential to spread more easily between humans was unknown.E
In the context of MERS-CoV, some argue that the dispute between the
Erasmus Medical Center and the Saudi vernment caused substantial delays
in researchers' access to viral samples.ff According to the Saudi Ministry
of Health, Erasmus had obtained the virus illegally and the conditions it
imposed on other researchers delayed development of treatments and
vaccines.E Negotiations between the U.S. and Saudi governments for virus
samples involved elaborate demands for research in Saudi territory,
participation by Saudi scientists, and other technological requirements.0
Similar difficulties emerged after clusters of microcephaly and other
neurological disorders in newborns were associated with the Zika virus in
Brazil in 2015.0 Even before cases became known in the United States,
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Paulo Gadelha, President of Fiocruz, a major Brazilian research institution,
said he could not send samples abroad due to a new Brazilian law that
protects national genetic resources.E Researchers at the CDC relied on Zika
viruses taken from earlier outbreaks in French Polynesia to work on Zika
diagnostics, and other researchers attempted to sequence Zika's genetic code
using virus samples from Puerto Rico.0 In the U.K., researchers used
samples drawn from Micronesia, the site of an outbreak in 2007.0 The
French relied on samples from Polynesia and Martinique. 3 In Spain
scientists used a Ugandan strain of Zika supplied by the United States. 3
Even scientists in Portugal, a country that shares extensive cooperative ties
to Brazil, had to work with a U.S. sample from the 1980s.0 The result was,
again, delays in the development of d~ignostics, therapeutics and vaccine
candidates for the vector-borne illness.ff
C. Solutions to MaterialTransfer Agreement Problems
The pace of low- and middle-income countries' demands to share the
benefits of biomedical research resulting from the use of human pathogens
taken from their territory has exceeded the development of legal mechanisms
to balance equity and science.0 While MTAs formed under the Nagoya
Protocol and other access-and-benefit sharing laws ensure benefits flow to
low- and middle-income countries, they also restrict and impede research and
development.0 Whatever their merit in ensuring that benefits are equitably
shared, research capacity in low- and middle-income countries is increased,
and biodiversity is protected, MTAs represent problems for the global
biomedical research process that must be solved.0 Some of these solutions
now exist on a small scale, as they were developed to address experiences in
individual countries, especially the United States.0 These solutions may be
expanded either within the national jurisdiction of individual countries, or
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established and operated at a global scale, espcially for research areas of
particular concern to global population health.El
1. Repositories and Biobanks
Generally "biobank," "biorepository," "biospecimen resource," and
"biological resource center" all refer to the facilities and related processes
that govern the collection, processing, and storage of biological specimens
often for specific classes of diseases like cancer, HIV/AIDS, and malaria.[]
Databases and bio-repositories not only provide common research resources,
but are also made possible because those contributing to them and drawing
from them agree to do so through MTAs that prohibit further negotiation.E These common pool resources are available to all users on terms that
encourage "efficiency, equitable use, and sustainability, and that are managed
by groups of varying sizes and interests."O Much of these repositories'
development was sparked by trends towards commercialization of research
outputs from public institutions in the U.S., which led to the assertion of
intellectual property rights over research reagents.l
There is variation in how repositories accept deposits from researchers,
though the determining factors usually include quality, novelty, and potential
interest from the research community.0 Other repositories may be
structured such that they only accept deposits of reagents from a specific
project or strain.E Finally, some repositories may not accept deposits and
will only distribute those materials generated by associated projects or
facilities.0 By acknowledging the original source repository, other
researchers are directed to that repository, which enhances visibility and
profile, two important factors in repository sustainability models.0
Repositories have the benefit of handling distribution, including
negotiations surrounding the manner in which materials are distributed. 4
Perhaps most importantly,
[E]stablished large-scale resource generation projects, repositories, and
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databases have the opportunity to develop governance mechanisms,
including standardized and simplified MTAs, that implement the data and
materials sharing policies of key funding agencies, concurrently buildin
capacity in research management with partner or recipient institutions. 4
One disincentive for deposits from the research community however, is
the fact that researchers often bear the cost of the deposit.A Funding
agencies could incentivize deposits, therefore, by requiring specific line
items in budgets representing the cost of deposits in repositories, which
would be reimbursed using public funds. 5
For example, the Malaria Research and Reference Reagent Resource
Center facilitates malaria research by improving availability of parasite,
vector, and human reagents and standardized assays.E Under this regime,
otherwise known as the "MR4" regime, researchers have access to a
centralized resource that provides parasites, proteins, reagents, and
mosquitos for reference standards or to generate new renewable reagents.0
Over 600 labs worldwide have deposited or withdrawn from the repository
for purposes of malaria research. - The National Institutes of Health (NIH
runs a similar program for HIV/AIDS through its AIDS Reagent Program.N5
An MR4 model could be expanded to other diseases, and international
agreements formed that shift the costs of participating from researchers to
governments.
2. Standardized Material Transfer Agreements for Routine Research and
Emergencies
MTAs always posed problems domestically and internationally.0 In the
U.S., solutions in both the routine and emergency contexts included standard
MTAs, essentially boilerplate documents that specified the rights of the
transferor and the transferee. [ 2 In the early 1990s, NIH developed the
Uniform Biological MTA (UMBTA), and more recently developed the
Standard Letter Agreement (SLA) for relatively simple transfers.E
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Internationally, the instrument developed to facilitate access to influenza
samples from the GISRS includes two types of standard MTAs: SMTA-1
(which covers exchanges between laboratories in the GISRS system) and
SMTA-2. SMTA-2 governs the obligations of research institutions and firms
outside the World Health Organization GISRS when using samples drawn
from the system.0 Since these MTAs are standardized, they help to reduce
transaction costs that are normally associated with exchange and transfer
especially through limiting the involvement of lawyers and governments.n
They help protect national or sovereign rights by stipulating to the specific
use of the material, limiting or prohibiting commercial use, and restricting
possible illegitimate or unacceptable claims on intellectual property.0
SMTAs may require recipients to make all non-confidential information from
the research available, and make the material available to others to facilitate
conservation/storage. Further distribution of the material must be conducted
under a new SMTA.EI
During the Zika public health emergency, the U.S. government developed
a specific "emergency use simple letter agreement," (EUSLA) under which
Zika samples could be shared for "any legitimate purpose," broadening the
typical language used for material transfers.0 This EUSLA was adopted at
the international level through the Global Health Security Initiative with the
WHO as an advisor to the project. E ] The EUSLA facilitated approximately
160 agreements to transfer Zika resource materials between academic,
government and industry researchers.E
3. Specialized International Instruments
While more complex and lengthier, MTA problems may also be addressed
through specialized international instruments, a mechanism envisioned in
Article 4 ofthe Nagoya Protocol. E ] The resolution to Indonesia's complaints
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about the GISRS was the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
(PIP).E The PIP was explicitly committed to "increas[ing] the access of
developing countries to vaccines and other pandemic related supplies.'fl
Under the Framework, major pharmaceutical manufacturers retain their
ability to access samples shared through GISRS, however firms using the
system must contribute towards half the cost of its maintenance
(approximately $30 million annually).0
Firms must promise to share either intellectual property, products
developed through use of the system, or other medical countermeasures
critical to pandemic response:
For manufacturers of vaccines and/or antivirals, the recipient shall commit
to at least two of the following options:
Al. Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to
WHO.
A2. Reserve at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production at
affordable prices to WHO.
A3. Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for
the pandemic to WHO.
A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for
the pandemic at affordable prices.
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually
agreed terms that should be fair and reasonable including in respect of
affordable royalties, taking into account development levels in the country
of end use of the products, on technology, know-how, products and
processes for which it holds IPR for the production of (i) influenza
vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or (iv) diagnostics.
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries
or grant to WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on intellectual
property rights, which can be sublicensed, for the production of pandemic
influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and diagnostics needed
in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to manufacturers in
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developing countries on appropriate terms And conditions and in
accordance with sound public health principles. 7

Although the framework is specific to pandemic influenza, the outbreak
of Ebola in West Africa and more general calls for equitable sharing of
benefits using genetic resources from developing countries have made it a
preliminary model for redistributing wealth from richer countries to poorer
ones. 5 The U.N.'s review panel that convened in the wake of the Ebola
crisis explicitly called for the agreement to be extended to "other novel
pathogens", making it legally binding, and achieving an appropriate balance
between obligations and benefits, in accordance with the principles of the
2010 Nagoya Protocol to the CBD.0 The PIP framework took four years to
materialize, but because its MTA terms have been negotiated, it may
represent a plausible solution to at least discreet classes of human-pathogen
sharing and any resulting benefits, including intellectual property. 4. Training and Education of Scientific Investigators
There is little about the education and training of infectious disease
researchers, virologists, and microbiologists to help them adjust to a role
involving negotiation and advocacy in the material transfer process.
Some
scientists join university or commercial TTOs, and others reach
administrative roles where they are able to share their expertise both directly
and through organizations like the Association of University Technology
Managers, but generally the structure of scientific education has not kept pace
with the changes in the management of biological research inputs.0
Given that researchers must be active voices in the material transfer
process, this aspect of modem research must change. International research
collaborations in the field of infectious disease increasingly require
researchers to be more extensively knowledgeable about regulations covering
the sampling of biological resources terms of MTAs, and formal agreements
establishing research partnerships.0 As most analysts of the problem have
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concluded, knowledge of "prior informed consent," "mutually agreed terms"
and "access and benefit sharing" must be integrated with the education and
research process, as researchers must now collaborate more with lawyers to
ensure that access to human pathogen samples continues as expeditiously as
possible.0
CONCLUSION

Access and benefit-sharing regulations have changed the way that some
research scientists from museums, biobanks universities and government
research institutes collect and share samples.0 However, the perception that
genetic resources are in the public domain persists in the biological sciences,
and many researchers are still unaware of the legal requirements surrounding
the collection and use of environmental genetic resources for research
purposes.3
MTAs were born from an interest to protect proprietary information.0
Appropriately constructed, MTAs can define the legal terms of transfer and
storage between the parties, while also accounting for intellectual property
rights concerns.0 They are, however ultimately a new barrier to research,
especially for infectious diseases.0 This article argued that current
mechanisms that have developed on a small scale - repositories, standardized
MTAs, specialized international instruments, and curricular changes in
scientific education and training - may help lower these barriers to
breakthroughs in diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.
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